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Introduction
The financial crisis in East Asia has had a far-reaching impact on the financial and corporate
sectors of the affected countries. It has caused systemic insolvency problems for commercial
banks and non-bank financial institutions as well as for highly indebted corporations. The
crisis has also provided an opportunity for countries to improve prudence and efficiency in
financial intermediation and enhance corporate governance to enable better resource
allocation and allow the private sector to lead economic development. Among policymakers,
international financial institutions, private organisations and academics, views are converg-
ing that the crisis was the result of interactions between massive capital flows and weak
domestic institutions, notably in the financial and corporate sectors. As a result discussions
are proceeding on how domestic financial and corporate systems can be improved to maximise
the benefits of, and reduce the risks posed by, global economic and financial integration.
This paper furthers the discussion by examining the financial and corporate sector
issues that were at the heart of the crisis. It revisits the fundamental weaknesses in financial
and corporate sectors that existed before the crisis, reviews the economic consequences of
these weaknesses and outlines the progress in financial and corporate sector restructuring.
The East Asian crisis was the result of interactions between massive capital flows and weak
domestic institutions. This paper examines the weaknesses in the financial and corporate
sectors that were at the heart of the crisis, reviews the economic consequences of these
weaknesses and outlines the progress in financial and corporate sector restructuring.
Significant progress has been made in reforming East Asian financial sectors. Govern-
ments have committed themselves to improving the regulation and supervision of banks and
non-bank financial institutions, raising competition in the financial sector, strengthening
corporate governance, and developing local capital markets and equity financing. East
Asia’s experience has shown that if a systemic crisis in the financial and corporate sectors
develops, governments need to put in place coherent frameworks for resolving banking and
corporate distress. Governments will also need to segment the crisis and prioritise their
responses.
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The reforms to strengthen these sectors are core components of the domestic institutional
changes that are needed if East Asia is to enjoy sustainable economic growth in the years to
come.
Structural weaknesses of the banking and corporate sectors
The pre-crisis period
Three factors heightened the vulnerability of the banking and corporate sectors in East Asia
before the crisis: first, domestic macroeconomic environments that allowed large inflows of
short-term, unhedged capital to fuel a credit boom; second, newly liberalised but insuffi-
ciently regulated financial markets; and third, highly leveraged corporations with large
domestic and external debt. In essence, the push that came from global capital markets, often
without due diligence and beyond prudence, interacted with poorly regulated domestic
financial systems to fuel a domestic credit expansion. This combination led domestic
corporations to borrow funds directly from international lenders or indirectly from domestic
financial institutions that had access to external financing and to overinvest in non-tradables
sectors (which manifested as property price bubbles, especially in Thailand) and in inefficient
manufacturing sectors. Weakly regulated financial systems and highly leveraged corpora-
tions exposed many East Asian countries to the shocks of changing investor expectations.1
Patterns of indebtedness varied across countries (Table 1). In Thailand finance
companies and commercial banks – availing themselves of foreign-currency-denominated
loans at low interest rates – borrowed heavily from abroad to invest in projects with low rates
of return, such as construction and real estate. The net foreign liabilities of financial
institutions rose from 6 per cent of domestic deposit liabilities in 1990 to one-third by 1996
(World Bank 1999). In Indonesia corporations were the primary borrowers from foreign
sources, mostly offshore. Korean banks also increased their exposure to foreign borrowing,
while Korean corporations borrowed heavily from domestic sources. Countries with relatively
low external debt (in particular short-term debt relative to foreign exchange reserves), such
as Malaysia and the Philippines, were not affected significantly, at least in the initial phase
of the East Asian crisis.
Three factors accentuated the crisis-affected countries’ incentives for borrowing abroad.
First, explicit or implicit government guarantees of financial institutions’ liabilities moti-
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vated excessive risk taking, which was passed on to the rest of the domestic economy. Second,
de facto fixed exchange rate arrangements provided a perception that foreign-currency-
denominated loans posed no risks for domestic borrowers or foreign lenders. Third, high
domestic financing costs and market segmentation created further incentives to borrow
Table 1 Initial conditions in East Asia, 1997
Indicators Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand
External debt US$137.0 bn US$154.4 bn US$43.9 bn US$46.5 bn US$102.0 bn
-public US$54.0 bn US$15.0 bn US$16.8 bn US$27.8 bn US$31.5 bn
-private US$83.0 bn US$139.4 bn US$27.1 bn US$18.5 bn US$70.5 bn
Short-term foreign
currency loans/ 232% 325% 81% 188% 162%
FXRa
Loans/GDP 60.0% 87.3% 152.0% 65.0% 150.0%
Foreign liabilities of 15.0% 55.2% 7.4% 31.5% 27.4%
banks/total liab.
Capital adequacy 8% target, 8% target, 8% target, 10% target, 8.5 % target,
ratio 87% of banks 7.25% actual 11.4% actual 16.0% actual 9.8% actual
NPLb/total loans 7.2% 5.9% 5.9% 4.7% 22.6%
(end-97)
Corporate debt
(98) US$118.0 bn US$444.0 bn US$120.2 bn US$47.5 bn US$195.7 bn
-external US$67.1 bn US$64.0 bn US$40.0 bn US$23.3 bn US$32.5 bn
-domestic US$50.9 bn US$380.0 bn US$80.2 bn US$24.2 bn US$163.2 bn
Debt/equity (96) 200% 350% 110% 140% 240%
Major financial 238 banks 26 commer- 48 banks 53 commer- 29 banks
Institutions (including cial banks, (including cial banks (including
(early 97) 10 foreign 30 merchant 13 foreign and 117 14 foreign
banks) banks  banks), thrift banks banks) and
39 finance 91 finance
companies companies
Deposit insurance None Yes None Yes None
(guarantee) (explicitly (explicitly un- (uncon- (explicitly
unlimited, limited, un- ditional, unlimited,
Jan. 98) conditional, unlimited, Aug. 97)
Nov. 97) Jan. 98)
Bankruptcy law Outdated, Modern Modern Outdated Outdated,
1908 1940
Note: a FXR refers to foreign exchange reserves.
b NPL refers to non-performing loans.
Sources: Asian Development Bank, Asia Recovery Report (March 2000); World Bank (2000); Kawai
(2000a, b).
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abroad. The domestic cost of funds appeared significantly higher than the costs of borrowing
offshore, even after taking into account exchange rate risks. Access to foreign markets was
only available to the largest and most creditworthy borrowers, giving these firms and banks
significant competitive advantage.2 
The capital inflows also fed into a system of corporate finance that heightened risks from
either abrupt changes in interest rates or the exchange rate. The corporate sector had grown
rapidly over the previous decades, in a context of underdeveloped bond markets and over-
reliance on bank financing. Despite the fact that productivity in the manufacturing sector in
many East Asian countries had already started to decline in the pre-crisis period, corporate
debt-to-equity ratios had climbed.3  At the same time, interest burdens became high. This
would present an excruciating dilemma for macroeconomic policymakers when the crisis
eventually came. Policymakers attempted to use a high interest rate policy to support the
exchange rate, at the cost of imperilling their highly leveraged corporate sectors and adding
distress to already weak domestic financial institutions.4
To summarise, against the background of global financial market integration, large
capital inflows fed into an institutional setting of poor regulation, limited transparency and
imprudent lending, often with negligible due diligence from foreign lenders. Government
guarantees of bank liabilities, coupled with a promise of fixed exchange rates, encouraged a
domestic credit boom that macroeconomic policy failed to manage. East Asian countries took
risks that left them exposed to shocks in several ways:
• Widening current account deficits, financed by short-term, unhedged capital inflows,
exposed the economies to sudden reversals in capital flows.
• Weaknesses in under-regulated financial sectors had allowed expansion of lending into
risky investments with low rates of return and inflated values, and often with currency
and maturity mismatches. This in turn exposed banks, non-bank financial institutions
and corporations to exchange rate risks.
• Corporations, often having insider relationships with banks and only weak incentives
to use capital efficiently, became even more highly leveraged when presented with
additional funding options from abroad. This exposed them to both interest rate and
exchange rate shocks.
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Evolution into systemic crisis
The financial crisis in East Asia was initially believed to be benign and unlikely to carry
significant consequences for the real economy. However, its adverse effect on real economic
activity proved much deeper than was initially anticipated. Indeed the financial crisis evolved
into a full-blown crisis with systemic proportions within a matter of months. Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia and Thailand were the most severely hit.
All these countries began to contract soon after the onset of the crisis, and all registered
sharply negative GDP growth rates in 1998. Surprisingly, the pace of GDP contraction was
faster than anticipated by the market, which continued to underestimate the severity of the
projected contraction for 1998 over the eighteen months following the devaluation of the Thai
baht.
The major reason these East Asian economies underwent such a rapid economic
contraction is that financial and corporate sectors were virtually paralysed by the steep
exchange rate depreciation and subsequent interest rate hikes and by shrinking domestic
demand. In response to exchange rate depreciation, all governments in the crisis-affected
countries raised domestic interest rates in an attempt to prevent further depreciation. The
combination of steep currency depreciations and interest rate rises adversely affected the
balance sheets of domestic firms. Depreciation suddenly inflated the local-currency value of
external debts held by banks and highly indebted corporations, and increased their debt-
servicing obligations. High domestic interest rates also raised the cost to corporations of
servicing domestic debt, mainly in the form of loans from commercial banks and non-bank
financial institutions.
It was clear that the potential demand-stimulating effects of the large currency
depreciations, working through changes in the relative price of tradables, were completely
swamped by the negative balance sheet effects, at least until the autumn of 1998. The
economies were also particularly vulnerable to interest rate hikes because corporations were
highly leveraged and because commercial banks were extensively exposed to the property
sector through lending against the collateral of real estate, the value of which was highly
sensitive to interest rates.
A large number of highly leveraged corporations found themselves unable to make debt-
service payments to creditors, domestic or foreign, thus turning their loans into non-
performing status. This aggravated the already deteriorating portfolios of commercial banks,
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making it difficult for them to continue providing new loans to those borrowers with overdue
debt. In addition the contraction of aggregate demand – largely brought about by steep
currency depreciation (debt deflation) and austere macroeconomic policy – began to suppress
corporate cash flows and profits. Corporate difficulties only added to the further deterioration
of the banking sector. The systemic crisis in the financial sector induced a flight of deposits
to quality institutions; many financial institutions began to shift their assets to safer
government bonds and central bank certificates instead of extending new loans to the
corporate sector. The lack of bank credit further aggravated the corporate sector’s difficulties.
Banking sector distress, corporate sector difficulties and macroeconomic deterioration
mutually reinforced the rapid economic contraction.5
Another reason for the unexpectedly rapid contraction of the crisis-affected economies
is the large multiplier effects from falling demand. Because of the degree of regional economic
integration through trade and investment, one country’s economic contraction and import
decline meant another’s export decline, spreading negative shocks across the region. Regional
economic linkages reinforced mutual contraction and magnified the severity and depth of
economic crisis in these countries beyond expectations.
In response to the economic contraction, all the crisis-affected East Asian countries
reversed their previously conservative fiscal policy and began to increase public spending by
mid-1998. Policymakers began to allow interest rates to fall, as stability in foreign exchange
and stock markets was restored. Nonetheless, corporate insolvency had become so wide-
spread, and commercial non-performing loans so large, that these countries continued to
contract despite the reversal of macroeconomic policy. Frameworks for resolving problem
banks, for recapitalising weak but viable banks and for restructuring corporate debt were
introduced, and substantial progress has been made in all of these areas – although with
varying pace and degrees across countries. A functioning financial system, however, has not
been fully restored particularly in Indonesia and Thailand, and the progress on corporate debt
and operational restructuring has been slow.
Fundamental structural weaknesses
The list of fundamental structural deficiencies in East Asia’s financial and corporate sectors
is long. It includes a lack of prudent risk management on the part of commercial banks,
ineffective banking regulation and supervision, poor accounting, auditing and disclosure
practices, and weak governance of corporations. The close relationship between corporations
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and banks, coupled with their influence over governments and legislatures, undermined even
the weak prudential safeguards that did exist. Ineffective legal and court systems contributed
to inadequate protection of minority shareholders.
It was known well before the crisis that East Asian banking systems relied on tacit
government approval of large loans (to sectors, if not to individual firms), and it was
understood that the major banks would not be allowed to fail. Under these circumstances,
credit analysis and risk management were largely redundant and, considering the function-
ing of courts, even documenting loans and liens was pointless. These weaknesses reinforced
each other. The motivation to upgrade bank supervision was undermined by the powerful
political connections of the major banks. The enforcement of single borrower or connected
lending limits and consolidated bank supervision was also problematic because of the web of
enterprises, banks and non-bank financial institutions controlled by the conglomerates.
Lacking effective legal protection, non-controlling shareholders were routinely ex-
ploited. Outsiders therefore preferred to fund firms through debt (with a specified stream of
payments) rather than through equity (which requires closer monitoring of firms). This
tendency toward high corporate leverage was compounded by the controlling owners’
reluctance to cede control or disclose much about the firm. The inadequacy of courts in
enforcing creditor contracts contributed to a shortening of loan maturities, with each lender
believing it would be possible to refuse to rollover the loan if problems arose.
Such East Asian countries as Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand rank very low on
measures of judicial efficacy and relatively high on concentration of ownership control. The
subservience of banks within larger conglomerates is most prevalent in Indonesia, the
Philippines and Malaysia. In Korea legislation prohibits chaebols (conglomerates) from
having a controlling ownership in banks, but the largest Korean chaebols have instead
influenced bank lending through the government and have obtained much of their credit
through their control of non-bank financial institutions. Although Thailand’s major private
banks are not part of broader conglomerates and are therefore not subservient to non-
financial enterprises, they are, as in other countries, politically well connected.
Economic recovery in 1999–2000
The worst period of output contraction ended during the first or second quarter of 1999 for
the economies hit by the crisis. Economic recovery was much stronger than expected. After
a sharp recession (with GDP averaging –7.8 per cent in 1998) the crisis-affected countries
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grew by 5 per cent in 1999 and 6 per cent in 2000. The pace of recovery, however, has been
uneven. The economic consolidation and recovery began in Korea, which recorded the most
dramatic improvements in output, exports and employment, registering economic growth of
11 per cent in 1999 and 9 per cent in 2000. Even Indonesia, despite its political turmoil, has
shown signs of an incipient economic rebound at 0.8 per cent in 1999 and 4.8 per cent in 2000.
As a result of the recovery, real GDP has exceeded the pre-crisis levels in Korea, Malaysia and
Thailand, while it may take a few more years for Indonesia to attain its pre-crisis level.6
The crisis-affected countries began to turn around for essentially three reasons. First,
initial economic adjustment and countercyclical macroeconomic policy allowed confidence to
be restored, leading to financial stabilisation (in the foreign exchange, money and capital
markets). Second, efforts in each country toward financial and corporate restructuring,
together with various measures of structural reform, helped boost consumer and investor
confidence in the economy. Third, strong growth in the United States and Europe bolstered
external demand in East Asia, thus supporting a mutually reinforcing recovery because of the
deepening trade linkages within the region. Export growth was strong, particularly in
manufacturing sectors such as electronics and information technology (IT) products. The
export expansion and the favourable current account balance, together with a threefold
increase in portfolio and foreign direct investment inflows, were sufficient to offset continuing
outflows of capital from the banking sector.
Despite economic recovery and its favourable effects on the banking and corporate
sectors, the crisis-affected countries continue to carry large non-performing loans and
corporate debt. In this sense the recovery is still vulnerable to external and domestic shocks,
because such shocks could erode bank and corporate profits and derail the restructuring
process.
Financial sector restructuring
Frameworks were created to resolve systemic crises in the financial and corporate sectors
(Table 2) and there has been some progress, albeit at a substantial fiscal cost, in initiating and
sustaining the restructuring of these sectors.
Despite some similarities in basic frameworks, actual approaches to restructuring have
varied across countries, reflecting differences in initial conditions, the structure of the
corporate system and the institutional capacities of central banks and other authorities.
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Korea and Malaysia undertook decisive policies to recapitalise banks and to guide corporate
restructuring, while Thailand and Indonesia initially pursued a market-based approach.
After experiencing inadequate results, the latter two countries shifted to more aggressive
policies to facilitate corporate restructuring. Malaysia’s framework has been one of the most
coherent for addressing financial and corporate restructuring.
Table 2 Institutional frameworks for financial and corporate sector
restructuring
Major Agency Official Agency
support for bank asset- for voluntary
institution recapitalisation management corporate
corporation restructuring
(AMC)
Indonesia Indonesian Bank Direct from Bank IBRA Jakarta Initiative
Restructuring Indonesia (BI) Task Force
Agency (IBRA) or via IBRA (JITF)a
Korea Financial Supervisory Korea Deposit Korea Asset Corporate
Service (FSS) Insurance Corpo- Management Restructuring
ration (KDIC) Corporation Coordination
(KAMCO) Committee
(CRCC)
Malaysia Bank Negara Danamodal Danaharta Corporate Debt
Malaysia (BNM) Restructuring
Committee
(CDRC)
Thailandb Bank of Thailand Financial Restruct- FRA to take Corporate Debt
 (BOT) uring Advisory assets of Restructuring
Committee closed finance Advisory
(funded by companies Committee
FIDF, BOT) unsold assets (CDRAC)
to AMC and
good assets
to RAB
Notes: a Based on the Frankfurt Agreement for debts to foreign commercial banks, the Indonesian Debt
Restructuring Authority (INDRA) was created to guarantee access to foreign exchange, but was
closed owing to its ineffectiveness.
b FIDF refers to the Financial Institutions Development Fund; FRA refers to the Financial Sector
Restructuring Authority; and RAB refers to Radanasin Bank.
Sources: Asian Development Bank, Asia Recovery Report (March 2000); World Bank (1999: 85).
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An advantage for a government-led approach is that it can deliver quick results in
reducing non-performing loans in the banking sector, recapitalising viable institutions and
effectively inducing restructuring through financial support, framework setting, and tax and
regulatory changes. The greater the coordination failure in the markets and the larger the
scale of the problem, the more a government-led approach makes sense. At the same time,
however, the approach entails risks. It places a substantial burden on taxpayers and may
effectively bail out negligent creditors and debtors, thereby inviting a recurrence of reckless
behaviour.
In contrast, a market-based approach has several advantages. First, by relying on
private rather than public resources to facilitate restructuring, it helps contain fiscal costs
and mitigate problems of moral hazard. Second, it generally works better in recovering non-
performing loans than a bureaucratically administered system under a public asset-
management corporation (AMC). Finally, it provides better incentives for restructuring,
leading to efficiency in the banking and corporate systems, and greater safety.
Facing a severe crisis with systemic proportions, it is perhaps less costly, in terms of
fiscal resources and lost output, and more effective to have a government-led approach with
safeguards against future moral hazard. As long as structural reform in the financial and
corporate sectors takes place in the medium term, government intervention can help the
private sector take a lead in developing these sectors.
By early 1998 large segments of the financial and corporate sectors in Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia and Thailand were severely distressed or insolvent. Equity and currency markets
had collapsed, private credit lines had been cut and output had declined sharply. The political
dimensions of the subsequent restructuring – involving conflicts over the recognition and
allocation of losses among shareholders, creditors, managers, workers and taxpayers – added
to the complexity of the resolution effort.
Table 3 shows that significant progress has been made to address the systemic crisis
in the financial sector. Governments initially injected liquidity into the banking sector to
avert runs on individual banks, and subsequently guaranteed all deposits and often other
financial liabilities as well. Having guaranteed bank deposits early in the crisis, governments
took responsibility for bank losses. Many non-viable and insolvent financial institutions were
closed, merged with healthier ones or temporarily nationalised; the bad loans of closed or
weak (but viable) financial institutions have been transferred to public (and, more recently
11
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in Thailand, private) asset-management corporations; and many weak but viable institutions
received capital injections from public funds.7
Governments have followed two main approaches to recapitalising banks and resolving
non-performing loans. In Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia, the strategy has been to inject
public funds into undercapitalised banks and transfer some non-performing loans to
centralised, publicly owned asset-management corporations, which were charged with asset
recovery and restructuring the financial liabilities of highly indebted corporations. These
corporations have acquired substantial amounts of non-performing loans from troubled
institutions: 75 per cent of Indonesia’s non-performing loans, 55 per cent of Korean loans and
43 per cent of Malaysia’s loans.
Thailand by contrast tied the provision of public funds to more stringent conditions on
bank owners and initially did not create one centralised institution to dispose of the non-
performing loans of private banks, leaving the banks to create majority-owned asset-
management corporations themselves. However, it did establish centralised agencies to
resolve the bad assets of finance companies – the Financial Sector Restructuring Authority
(FRA) as an asset disposal agency and the Asset Management Corporation (AMC) as the
bidder of last resort. The FRA acquired assets totalling 920 billion baht (US$25 billion) from
fifty-six closed finance companies. Of these, it sold 600 billion baht (US$16 billion) worth of
core assets to the markets at an average of 25 per cent of face value, and 197 billion baht (US$5
billion) of assets to the AMC at an average of 17 per cent of face value. The Chuan government
decided not to set up a public corporation for the assets of private banks because it wanted
these banks to recapitalise themselves and devise their own strategies for asset disposal. But
it created a public asset-management corporation, owned by the Financial Institutions
Development Fund (FIDF), to take the non-performing loans off the balance sheet of the state
bank, Krung Thai Bank. More recently the new Taksin government decided to set up a public
asset-management corporation to clean up the balance sheets of private banks.
In all countries non-performing loans have declined over the past two years, except in
the Philippines where there has been a rise since early 2000 (Table 4). Non-performing loans
in the banking sector have declined the most, but are still far bigger than the current loan-
loss provisions. In all countries except Indonesia, the resolution of non-performing loans and
injection of capital, both public and private, have restored capital adequacy to levels that are
on average above the minimum standard of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
However, some individual banks have yet to achieve the 8 per cent threshold, and profitability
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is low or even negative, thus eroding their capital base over time. In many others, portfolios
remain vulnerable and need to be covered by loan-loss provisions or a strengthened capital
base. How much capital will be needed depends on the underlying weaknesses in loan
portfolios, the pace and sustainability of economic recovery, and the profitability of banks.
Another round of financial sector consolidation is underway. In Korea and Thailand,
temporarily nationalised banks have begun to be reprivatised. In addition, the banking
sectors in these countries have been opened to foreign institutions to attract strategic
investors and technical expertise, and to promote competition in domestic banking. The
Korean government announced that additional resources (an estimated 40 trillion won)
would be needed to complete the second round of financial sector restructuring. Further
consolidation of financial institutions, including mergers of nationalised banks, is expected.
In Malaysia fifty-eight financial institutions were merged into ten groups by the end of 2000.
Table 4 Non-performing loans of crisis-affected countries (per cent of total
loans)
1997            1998               1999 2000
Dec. Dec. Mar. Jun. Sep. Dec. Mar. Jun. Sep. Dec.
Indonesiaa 7.2 48.6 58.7 39.0 38.9 32.9 32.1 30.0 26.9 18.8
incl. IBRA n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 64.0 62.4 63.5  61.7 57.1
Koreab 5.9 10.4 11.4 11.3 10.1 10.9 10.9 13.6 12.3 n.a.
incl. KAMCO 8.0 16.1 17.0 16.4 15.9 15.8 17.9 18.9 17.9 n.a.
Malaysiac 5.9 18.9 18.2 18.1 17.8 16.8 16.7 16.2 16.1 15.3
incl. Danaharta 5.9 22.6 22.7 23.4 23.6 23.6 23.3 23.2 n.a n.a.
Philippinesd 4.7 10.4 13.2 13.1 13.4 12.5 14.4 14.6 15.3 15.1
Thailande 22.6 45.0 47.0 47.4 44.7 38.9 37.2 32.0 22.6 17.7
incl. AMCs n.a. 45.0 47.0 47.4 44.7 41.5 39.8 34.8 30.6 26.5
Notes: a Figures are for commercial banks and use the ‘stringent’ definition of an NPL (i.e., including
‘special mention’). The second line includes NPLs transferred to the IBRA.
b Figures are for all financial institutions and the second line includes NPLs transferred to
KAMCO.
c Figures are for commercial banks, finance companies and merchant banks. The second line
includes NPLs transferred to Danaharta. Malaysian authorities calculate NPLs on the basis of
NPLs minus interest in suspense and specific provisions and report NPL ratios of 10.4 per cent,
rather than 16.1 per cent, excluding Danaharta in September 2000.
d Figures are for commercial banks.
e Figures are for commercial banks and finance companies. The second line includes the
estimated amount of NPLs transferred to wholly owned private AMCs.
Source: World Bank staff.
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In Indonesia, where the banking system is not yet functioning properly and there are still too
many commercial banks in operation, continued restructuring and consolidation of commer-
cial banks is needed.
Country progress
Korea
The Korean banking system was rescued from defaulting to foreign creditors in late 1997 with
the government (partially) guaranteeing the foreign debts of the banks on the condition that
the banks’ foreign liabilities would be restructured in early 1998. Having guaranteed the
banks’ foreign liabilities and deposits, the government assumed a central role in the
subsequent recapitalisation. The election of a new president unbeholden to the corporate and
banking establishment permitted the newly created Financial Supervisory Commission to
force the pace of change and strengthened the credibility of the government’s initial responses
to the crisis. In the first round of financial sector restructuring, the government committed
64 trillion won (US$53 billion) in April 1998 to recapitalise financial institutions, pay deposit
and credit claims of bankrupt institutions, and reduce the level of non-performing loans
including by transferring them to the asset-management corporation (KAMCO). When most
of this fund had been exhausted by the end of 1999, the government’s commitments for
financial sector restructuring had reached 74 trillion won. In early December 2000, an
additional 40 trillion won (US$33 billion) of public resources was approved to complete the
second round of financial sector restructuring. In total, including recycled assets, the
government will have spent about 150 trillion won (US$124 billion) by the end of the second
round of financial restructuring.
Significant progress has been made to restructure the financial system. First, the
number of financial institutions has been reduced drastically: the number of commercial
banks fell from twenty-six at the end of 1997 to seventeen at the end of 2000, and the number
of merchant banks from thirty to four during the same period. Second, the level of non-
performing loans in the system has remained stable during 2000 despite the introduction of
more stringent loan classifications (the forward-looking criteria) in December 1999. Third,
banks and other financial institutions are better capitalised: the average BIS capital
adequacy ratio for the eight major commercial banks was 10.3 per cent at the end of 2000.
Banks needed to raise additional capital because of the shift to forward-looking criteria, the
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losses incurred from the de facto bankruptcy of the Daewoo group and decline in the bond
market (see below), and the pressures from ongoing corporate restructuring. Fourth, foreign
investment in the financial sector has increased significantly. As a result commercial banks
are now evolving into two distinctive groups – one with a fair degree of foreign ownership,
better financial results and higher capital adequacy ratios; and a group of weaker, mainly
government-owned banks that are more reliant on government resources.
Responding to the management difficulties of Daewoo and Hyundai, Korea’s largest
chaebols, has proved difficult for maintaining the health of the financial system, partly owing
to their ready access to finance from their affiliated investment trust companies (ITCs). The
ITC industry almost tripled in size between the end of 1997 and mid-1999, almost equalling
the size of total commercial bank deposits. The de facto collapse of Daewoo – the second largest
chaebol with liabilities of about US$75 billion – in August 1999, prompted investors to
withdraw funds from the ITCs, which in turn sold their bond holdings to finance the
withdrawals, depressing bond prices. At the behest of the government, the banks contributed
some 20 trillion won to support bond prices, but this support remained susceptible to rising
interest rates and ITC prospects. The Financial Supervisory Service, the regulatory watch-
dog, has asked Korea Development Bank, a state-owned bank, to purchase commercial paper
and corporate bonds of financially distressed companies such as Hyundai Electronics,
Hyundai Engineering and Construction Company, and Ssangyong Cement Company, in order
to provide liquidity support and help these companies avoid a credit crunch.
The second round of financial sector restructuring and consolidation is now underway
in Korea, with an estimated 40 trillion won dedicated for further consolidation of private
financial institutions and to assist with sales or mergers of nationalised banks.
Malaysia
Of the four most affected countries, Malaysia was best positioned to confront the crisis owing
to its relatively low foreign debt and corporate leverage at the outset, the latter reflecting the
deeper development of the domestic capital market.
The government advocated mergers rather than the closure of any financial institution
or sale to foreign institutions, and tightly orchestrated Malaysia’s financial sector restructur-
ing program. Initially, 16 billion ringgit (US$42 billion) was allocated for bank recapitalisa-
tion and by mid-1999 Danamodal, the institution created by the central bank to recapitalise
banks, had completed its injection of 6.4 billion ringgit into ten financial institutions. By that
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time several of these institutions had begun to repay the capital, and as a result estimates
of required capital outlays by Danamodal were revised down. By the second half of 1999, the
national asset-management corporation, Danaharta, had completed two asset carve-outs,
acquiring 47 billion ringgit worth of non-performing loans from financial institutions as of
mid-2000 (37 billion ringgit removed from the banking system and 10 billion ringgit from non-
banking and offshore institutions). Danaharta had succeeded in resolving loans worth 32
billion ringgit as of June 2000. The Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC) had
received indications of interest in corporate restructuring from seventy-five companies with
a total debt of 46 billion ringgit as of the end of July 2000.
In view of the need to help establish a core group of competitive local institutions ahead
of Malaysia’s accession to the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in 2003,
the government in July 1998 announced a plan to consolidate fifty-eight institutions in the
financial sector (twenty-one banks, twenty-five finance companies and twelve merchant
banks) and issued a directive in mid-1999 to force these institutions to merge into six financial
groups by April 2000. This raised a number of concerns within the forcibly merged institutions
and ultimately about the impact on resource allocation. As a result the government withdrew
the directive and granted approval in February 2000 for the formation by December 2000 of
ten banking groups to be led by anchor banks. Although the consolidation of the banking sector
has been virtually completed, operational and management restructuring of banks has to be
achieved to enhance banking sector competitiveness and efficiency.
In March 2001 Bank Negara Malaysia announced its Financial Master Plan to improve
the competitiveness of domestic banks over the next ten years. The first phase of the plan
(2001–03) focuses on improving the competitiveness of domestic banks, including allowing
mergers of investment banks and securities firms, and encouraging electronic financial
services. The second phase (2004–06) promotes further competition through removing the
restrictions on the number of branches that the fourteen foreign banks already in Malaysia
can operate. In the third phase (2007–10), new licenses will be issued to allow further entry
of foreign banks.
Indonesia
Indonesia’s situation is the most daunting because of the depth of its structural problems, the
weaker pre-crisis condition of the banking system, the heavy foreign debt of Indonesian
corporations, the substantial currency depreciation in the aftermath of the crisis, the serious
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constraints posed by the fiscal cost of bank recapitalisation and a lack of political consensus
on the direction of reform. The reforms also stalled because of the political controversy over
the mid-1999 Bank Bali scandal involving the then ruling Golkar party.
The crisis had a profound impact on the Indonesian banking system. In an effort to
stabilise the system, 70 out of 237 banks have been closed and another 12 banks nationalised,
leaving 159 banks in operation. Government-owned institutions now control 70 per cent of the
banking system’s deposits (through four state banks, twelve nationalised banks, twenty-six
regional development banks and the majority stake in the seven ‘private’ recapitalised
banks). The government has issued 650 trillion rupiah (about US$80 billion) of sovereign
bonds to recapitalise the banks to a capital adequacy standard of 4 per cent and to honour its
guarantee of the deposits and liabilities of closed banks. Approximately 276 trillion rupiah
was required just to recapitalise the four state banks. On average Indonesian banks have
achieved the 8 per cent capital adequacy standard, but some banks seem unable to achieve
the profitability needed to enlarge their capital to meet the requirement of 8 per cent capital
adequacy by 2001.
While there has been some progress on restructuring the largest state bank, Bank
Mandiri, restructuring of the operations of three other state banks (BNI, BRI and BTN) has
been slow. The government has been finalising business plans and performance contracts
with the management of each of these banks. Some of the issues include concerns about the
quality of the restructured part of the loan portfolio and that of the remaining non-performing
loans, the slow pace of operational restructuring, and the viability of future business plans
and performance.
In light of the level of stress and existing political and economic trends, the number of
banks is expected to continue to shrink, particularly through mergers. Some of the stronger
banks are likely to make strategic alliances with foreign partners, and the banks under the
control of the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) are expected to be sold to
strategic investors. As public resources for further recapitalisation are limited, additional
forbearance on capital adequacy regulations may continue to be needed.
The slow and inadequate progress is despite the number of new institutions created in
the wake of the crisis. They are abundant: the IBRA to lead the restructuring efforts in the
most insolvent banks; the Asset Management Unit (AMU) under the IBRA to acquire non-
performing loans from frozen or merged banks; the Jakarta Initiative to facilitate voluntary
corporate restructuring; a new bankruptcy law and a newly established commercial court;
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and the Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency (INDRA) under the Frankfurt Agreement to
protect debtors and creditors against exchange risk.8
Thailand
The Thai authorities closed two-thirds of Thailand’s finance companies in 1997 and created
the Financial Sector Restructuring Authority to ‘manage and liquidate’ the assets of the
closed finance companies; but decided to sell the claims quickly. This was largely completed
through a series of auctions (realising about US$4 billion and an average price of about 25 per
cent of face value) and the buyers have been left to deal with the debtors without the
government’s involvement.
The banks were treated differently, both because the bad loans were on a larger scale
and because (having earlier confronted political dissension on which finance companies to
close) the government did not want to become the creditor even temporarily. The strategy has
been to encourage banks to raise capital on their own by imposing stringent requirements on
the provision of tier-one capital from the government (see Box 1). Banks raised capital
amounting to 902 billion baht between January 1998 and June 2000, including private tier-
1 capital (314 billion baht) and injections of public funds into state-owned banks. Nonetheless,
most institutions remain undercapitalised, partly due to the high number of non-performing
loans and partly to regulatory forbearance. Since their peak in mid-1999, non-performing
loans have declined, aided by faster repayment and restructuring and by the transfer of bad
loans to the bank-owned asset-management corporations. The removal of tax disincentives
and a regulation allowing private banks to transfer loans at book value less the provisioning
required under the existing forbearance program encouraged banks to establish majority-
owned asset-management corporations (World Bank 2000). On the other hand, despite the
phasing out of explicit forbearance at the end of 2000, implicit forbearance continues after
2000, obfuscating balance sheets.9
Significant progress has been made on financial sector consolidation. The number of
financial institutions has declined substantially due to closure, liquidation or mergers of non-
viable institutions. The number of finance companies has been reduced from ninety-one in the
pre-crisis period to twenty. Several local banks have been sold to foreign banks, which for the
first time have full branch networks and the ability to raise funds nationally. Foreign bank
participation in the financial system, including both single-branch foreign banks and hybrid
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Box 1 Thailand’s 14 August 1998 bank recapitalisation program
The two recapitalisation schemes announced on 14 August 1998 were to give bankers an incentive
to collect on their non-performing loans and operate their bank efficiently. Neither elicited much
interest, however.
Under the tier-one scheme, the government takes a (preferred) equity stake in the bank if
it immediately adopts the accounting, provisioning and capital adequacy rules that were phased
in by the end of 2000. The government then eliminates any negative net worth (without taking
equity) and brings the equity up to 2.5 per cent of risk-adjusted assets by injecting tradable
government bonds of 10-year maturity. The government matches every dollar of new private
equity up to the requisite 4.5 per cent (lowered from 6 per cent as part of regulatory forbearance).
Thus the government would have a majority stake in any bank with capital under 2.5 per cent, but
its stake would be a minor one in banks closer to the requisite 4.5 per cent capital. The new private
investors have a call option to buy out the government’s stake, but until these options are exercised,
the government has the right to replace the bank’s managers. Although only intended for use
against egregious conduct, as no contract could spell out all the contingencies, the threat hangs like
a Damocles sword and only two quasi-private banks (Thai Military Bank and Siam Commercial
Bank) have ‘volunteered’ for the scheme.
The tier-two scheme also injects government funds, except that instead of (preferred, tier-
one) equity, the government would hold the bank’s subordinated debt (ten-year maturity with an
interest rate of 1 per cent over the government bond rate) up to 2 per cent of the bank’s risk-
weighted assets. The amount declines over time to make its early use more attractive. Further-
more, this injection is tied to the amount of corporate debt that the bank (as creditor) restructures
in agreements with the indebted firms (with terms consistent with central bank guidelines). This
facility also has not been utilised because banks lack tier-one capital, not tier-two capital.
Instead of using the schemes, many banks have issued new equity to private investors; but
it would be incorrect to infer (through revealed preference) that their net worth is therefore
positive. The new equity is inseparably tied to subordinated debt (SLIPS or Stapled Limited
Interest Preferred Securities and CAPS or Capital Augmented Preferred Securities) with a yield
high enough to attract bank depositors. So although there may now be sufficient ‘private equity’
at risk in these banks, the danger is that the government may not be able to resist the political
pressures to protect unwary private investors from any subsequent losses.
The Thai recapitalisation scheme has a number of attractive features, but having the
government retain any right to change management control in the bank has limited its appeal. This
right is important only because the government takes an equity stake after eliminating the
negative net worth. An alternative would be for the link to corporate debt restructuring to be with
tier-one capital and to rely on banking supervisors to detect any fraud.
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banks, increased from the pre-crisis level of 10 per cent of assets to 16 per cent by the end of
2000. Their market share is expected to rise further.
Excluding asset sales from the FRA, the cumulative total of restructured debt reached
1.07 trillion baht by the end of 1999. But initial debt negotiations appear to have produced
inadequate restructuring to allow for debt service to be sustained by operational cash flows,
requiring further rounds of restructuring.
The new government, under Prime Minister Taksin, has decided to set up an official
asset-management corporation and to work actively on resolving the non-performing loans
of Thai private banks. The initial proposal is for the AMC to exchange FIDF guarantee bonds
for about 1 trillion baht of non-performing loans in state-owned banks and 250 billion baht
of non-performing loans in private banks at net book value (outstanding principal balance net
of provision). This is about one-half of the current non-performing loans in private banks
excluding transfers to private AMCs and written-off loans. Non-performing loans to be
transferred will be limited to multi-creditor accounts with viable borrowers who are
candidates for corporate restructuring. Banks would share gains and losses with the
government on their transferred non-performing loans if recovery rates differ from initial
transfer prices. One of the key issues is whether the proposed AMC will effectively implement
extraordinary executive powers or an expedited legal regime to speed resolution of these
difficult cases.
Corporate sector restructuring
Institutional frameworks for corporate restructuring
Corporate sector restructuring is the other side of the process of financial sector restructuring
– the substantial overhang of bank non-performing loans was largely a consequence of
distressed corporate performance. To restructure corporate debt, operational and organisa-
tional restructuring of the corporations themselves is often required.
Governments have introduced three frameworks to resolve corporate debt overhang.
First, court-based insolvency procedures have been strengthened, including bankruptcy,
reorganisation and foreclosure laws, legal protection of the rights of creditors and the
establishment of functioning judiciary systems. Second, formal frameworks for voluntary,
out-of-court debt negotiations have been developed under the London Rules.10 Third, official
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asset-management companies have been empowered to restructure distressed debts and
corporations, in addition to disposing of acquired assets. To facilitate the restructuring of
corporate debt and company operations, governments have promoted greater asset mobility
through regulatory and tax incentives, including eliminating constraints on corporate
mergers and acquisitions and on debt-to-equity conversions and swaps, and opening sectors
to foreign investors.
Some progress has been made in corporate debt and operational restructuring through
each of these three channels.
Formal insolvency procedures
Korea and Malaysia have relatively strong formal insolvency frameworks, while Indonesia
and Thailand have weak ones. In Korea the insolvency procedure was strengthened in 1999
with the introduction of prepackaged bankruptcies. Under this system companies under a
Box 2 The role of bankruptcy laws
Early during the crisis, the existing bankruptcy laws were thought inadequate to ensure corporate
restructuring, and these were urgently redrafted. Some observers, lacking the confidence that
creditors would rollover loans, wanted the law to protect the debtors from needless liquidation and
thereby avert widespread unemployment. Others wanted to strengthen creditors’ rights to seize
control of the firms and oust owners who were considered ineffective. Protecting creditor rights
requires perfecting titles, registries and court administration rather than the bankruptcy law per
se; but as it was easier to redraft laws (revisions may have been needed anyway in the long run),
this proceeded quickly.
Korea (1998), Indonesia (1998) and Thailand (1999) introduced new or amended bank-
ruptcy laws, but the filings have been a mere trickle. Those who feared excessive liquidations were
relieved, but those who expected rapid restructuring of debts were disappointed. Early decisions
betrayed judges’ confusion (or their susceptibility to favours) and training for judges has been
deemed important. Thus while better bankruptcy laws may have been desirable, their passage did
not necessarily spur debt negotiations. For this, strong support by government commitment and
institutional capacity is needed.
Source: World Bank (2000: 77).
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‘workout’ program will go into receivership if at least half of the creditors agree. In Thailand
the bankruptcy law was revised in 1999 to introduce a reorganisation mechanism, but the
bankruptcy regime is still biased against creditors. Indonesia also revised its bankruptcy law,
which became effective in August 1998. A special commercial court was also established, but
the court proceedings have been very slow in dealing with bankruptcies.
In Malaysia more than 190 companies have filed for court protection under section 176
of the Companies Act in the first quarter of 2000 and more than 1,000 winding-up petitions
have been received. However, the ability of debtor firms to ask for extensions of stay orders
against their creditors is said to be hindering restructuring. At the end of 1999, 187 companies
in Korea with combined assets of 50 trillion won were under court receivership. In late 1999
the FSS concluded, however, that about half of the chaebol affiliates under court supervision
had made insufficient progress on restructuring.
In general the use of formal insolvency procedures has been limited in corporate
restructuring.11 Few bankruptcy cases have been filed in the crisis-affected countries and the
number completed is even smaller. Gaps in bankruptcy legislation (e.g., biases against
creditors) and weak institutional capacity (e.g., ineffective judiciary processes) in Indonesia
and Thailand suggest that the formal resolution of debts may continue to be slow. There is
a continuing need for the legal system in these two countries to provide more reliable
protection for creditors.
Formal voluntary frameworks
The efficient resolution of a systemic corporate crisis depends on out-of-court processes that
are preferably formal, well organised and purposeful. In a systemic crisis involving many
hundreds of large corporations, frequent recourse to court-supervised procedures would
overwhelm the capacity of courts and insolvency professionals. Thus the efficient resolution
of the crisis must rely on out-of-court processes. An informal unstructured process, however,
is not enough. Notably, Thailand initially adopted a soft approach of relying on a set of
principles (the Bangkok Rules, modelled after the London Rules), which turned out to be
ineffective. Korea experimented with government-sanctioned ‘bankruptcy avoidance’ loans,
which did not give creditors sufficient access to perform due diligence and develop restruc-
turing plans, and merely postponed the problem. These initial efforts were abandoned in both
countries in favour of more structured processes – through the Corporate Restructuring
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Agreement (CRA) and Corporate Restructuring Coordination Committee (CRCC) in Korea
and the Corporate Debt Restructuring Advisory Committee (CDRAC) office in Thailand.12
By July 2000 Malaysia’s CDRC had received seventy-five applications, with total debts
of 46 billion ringgit. Of these, thirty-six cases had been resolved by that date, amounting to
25 billion ringgit (55 per cent of the total value of applications), seventeen cases involving 4
billion ringgit had been withdrawn or rejected (8 per cent), and twenty-two cases involving
17 billion ringgit still needed resolution (36 per cent).
Thailand’s CDRAC had a total of 12,027 cases in January 2001, both large corporations
and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), with outstanding debts of 2.61 trillion baht.
The CDRAC focused on 2,821 large corporate ‘target debtors’ with debts of 2.31 trillion baht,
of which 1.04 trillion baht (45 per cent) has been restructured, while 1.21 trillion baht (52 per
cent) has not yet been settled and is before the courts.
In Indonesia, as of August 2000, the Jakarta Initiative Task Force (JITF) had sixty-
seven active corporate cases involving 13.93 trillion rupiah (US$13.3 billion) in debts.
Twenty-four cases had been completed, involving US$5.2 billion (39 per cent), which is
significant progress in comparison to the less than US$1 billion of debt restructuring up to
the early part of 2000.
In Korea the demonstrated ability of creditors to force a dozen chaebols into receivership
and take control of Daewoo has had a positive effect on the incentive to restructure. The CRA
program of ‘lead-bank-led workouts’ has provided some financial stability to distressed
corporations. The restructuring of the largest chaebols is moving ahead. Hyundai, Samsung,
LG and SK met the CRA’s Capital Structure Improvement Plans (CSIPs) for 1999. However,
consolidated financial statements under the new reporting system showed debt-to-equity
ratios higher than the required 200 per cent for the largest chaebols: LG reported 260 per cent,
Hyundai 230 per cent and SK 220 per cent. There has also been some progress in the
restructuring of smaller chaebols. At the end of March 2000, a total of seventy-six firms were
under the CRA workout program, covering 43 trillion won of troubled debt.
Asset disposal and restructuring through official AMCs
While public asset-management corporations are able to reduce non-performing loans of
distressed financial institutions or take over assets from closed institutions, they are not a
panacea for resolving corporate distress (Kawai et al. 2000). Korea’s asset-management
corporation (KAMCO) and Thailand’s FRA may not be good test cases, as the former is
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oriented toward providing liquidity while the latter is focused on bundling and selling assets
taken over from failed finance companies. The wholesale closing of fifty-seven finance
companies in Thailand and the transfer of their assets to the FRA for eventual disposal may
have hurt the development of a credit culture in Thailand, as debtors came to believe that they
could escape repayment by driving their creditors out of business. Experience elsewhere with
asset-management corporations is also mixed. They are not always adept at restructuring
company operations.
Asset-management corporations in Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia have made some
progress in asset disposal (Table 5). By July 2000 KAMCO had disposed of about 40 per cent
of the non-performing loans acquired. Malaysia’s Danaharta, as of June 2000, had resolved
69 per cent of the assets under its control. In Indonesia the disposal of the IBRA’s assets has
hardly begun, reflecting poor asset values, politically powerful debtors and an inadequate
legislative and regulatory environment. In Thailand the FRA has disposed of some 70 per cent
of the assets of the finance companies that were closed, while disposal data are scarce for the
asset-management corporations set up by private banks. Danaharta’s recovery rate has been
high, at 65 per cent of the face value of assets (in June 2000), and recovery rates on recent sales
by the IBRA and KAMCO have started to rise. Notwithstanding the progress on asset
disposal, the influence the asset-management corporations have had on fostering genuine
corporate restructuring is less clear. These corporations have an opportunity not only to
improve the quality of restructuring, but also to influence the pattern of prospective
ownership.
While Malaysia’s Danaharta has achieved some success on this front, it is still too early
to draw definite conclusions. It is also quite uncertain how effective the IBRA will be as an
agent for corporate restructuring. The IBRA’s effectiveness at corporate restructuring
depends on its ability to enforce creditor rights (either through the courts or through its
extraordinary ‘PP17’ powers),13 on insulation from political pressure (notably, to protect well-
connected debtors), and on its ability to restructure corporate debts on purely commercial
considerations. The IBRA must be able to give debt discounts or write-offs without worrying
about legal liability or allegations of collusion, corruption or nepotism. If the Indonesian
government can muster the institutional capacity, the IBRA’s efforts would benefit from the
orchestrated use of existing government powers against recalcitrant corporate debtors. For
the IBRA to function effectively in its role as the principal agent for restructuring Indonesia’s
corporate sector, it needs to resolve its caseload quickly and to the greatest commercial
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advantage by bulk sales of loans, by cleaning up loans and conveying them to local and foreign
financial institutions as quickly as possible through competitive auctions, and perhaps by
outsourcing debt restructuring negotiations to outside advisers working on an incentive
basis.
Despite some progress, the pace of corporate debt restructuring has been slower than
that of financial sector restructuring and has been uneven – again Korea leads and Indonesia
lags – but no country is near completion, which may well take close to a decade. Temptation
to slow the restructuring process exists because of the presence of vested interests and the
likelihood of a nationalistic backlash against fire sales of assets to foreigners. Interest groups
are trying to slow the restructuring process in order to maintain their equity stake in, and
control over, indebted corporations, which would otherwise have been lost during debt and
operational restructuring. Some bank creditors may be unwilling to pursue aggressive
corporate restructuring because doing so would force them to realise losses and reduce
capital, and thereby dilute bank ownership and control. Slow restructuring will mean that
corporate debt will continue to choke credit to the corporate sector.
If a voluntary corporate debt restructuring is to work, there needs to be a credible threat
from the judicial/legal system: the legal alternatives to an out-of-court agreement must be
made clear and credible. The restructuring of Daewoo illustrates how crucial it is to end the
‘too big to fail’ policy and establish an effective insolvency procedure. Improvements to court
processes, not just bankruptcy and reorganisation procedures but also procedures for
foreclosing on collateral and registering security interest, would help protect creditor rights
and provide debtors with a credible threat to negotiate in good faith.14 This would also
contribute to resolving non-performing loans.
Consequences of financial and corporate restructuring
Government programs for financial and corporate sector restructuring have had three
important consequences: namely that market confidence has been restored, that govern-
ments have become large holders of corporate assets and that large public sector debt has built
up. Essentially, substantial portions of corporate assets have been brought under government
control and this has been financed by government borrowing.
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Restoration of market confidence
There is no question that assertive efforts toward financial and corporate restructuring and
reform in each affected country have helped boost consumer and investor confidence in the
future course of the economy. That governments have created various frameworks to resolve
systemic crisis in financial and corporate sectors and have achieved certain progress in
carrying out the restructuring process, as explained above, has supported the economic
recovery in 1999 and 2000.
The financial system has been stabilised by stopping large-scale bank runs, resolving
insolvent institutions, transferring non-performing loans from closed or weak institutions to
public asset management corporations, recapitalising weak but viable institutions through
incentives such as forbearance, public resources and the opening of the system to foreign
strategic investors. Certain progress in corporate debt restructuring through court-based
bankruptcy or reorganisation procedures, voluntary negotiations of corporate restructuring
between debtors and creditors outside of courts (the London Rules approach), and AMC-led
restructuring, has not only stabilised the finances of corporations but also firmly established
the view that countries are serious about resolving non-performing loans.
Together with these restructuring efforts, governments have committed themselves to
improving the regulation and supervision of banks and non-bank financial institutions,
raising competition in the financial sector, strengthening corporate governance, and devel-
oping capital markets. These measures have attempted to rectify the fundamental weak-
nesses of the financial and corporate sectors that were behind the 1997–98 crisis and thus
have helped restore market confidence in the future direction of each economy.
Government acquisition of banks and bank assets
The state has become an important holder of corporate assets through the acquisition of banks
and bank assets (Table 6). In Indonesia the government holds 70 per cent of banking assets,
while the governments of Korea, Thailand and Malaysia own 60 per cent, 30 per cent and 20
per cent of banking assets, respectively. The process of disposing of the acquired assets and
restructuring the debts and debtor corporations has only recently begun.
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The manner in which governments and public asset-management corporations dena-
tionalise acquired banks and bank assets has important implications for the future structure
of the economy, and therefore should be aimed at improving corporate structure.
The presence of cross-ownership in much of East Asia – where banks and other financial
institutions are part of the conglomerate (and subservient to it) – offers little or no meaningful
opportunity for banks to provide effective corporate governance. Moreover, this structure has
distorted credit allocation in favour of firms affiliated to conglomerates (notwithstanding
formal limits on connected lending, which are more difficult to enforce on conglomerates) both
before and after the crisis. The continued financing of firms affiliated to the conglomerates
has slowed the restructuring of these firms, whereas non-affiliated firms and SMEs have
found it difficult to obtain finance, particularly since the crisis. Finally, if firms within the
conglomerate have ready access to credit from their affiliated financial institutions, their
incentive to seek alternative means of financing (such as bonds and equity) is diminished,
reinforcing the domination of bank lending.
The crisis-resolution process provides a good opportunity to further dilute cross-
ownership structures. Foreign banks and strategic investors are obvious sources of new
Table 6 Government ownership of financial system assets in East Asia (per
cent)
                Indonesia                Korea Malaysia            Thailand
mid- mid- mid- mid- mid- mid-
99 00 99 99 99 00
Share of assets carved out 23 21 3 4 10a 22a
Share of assets held by state-owned and
   nationalised financial institutions 55 70 55 14 22 19
Total share of banking assets held
by state 78b 72b 58 18 32c 30c
Assets held by the state as a share
of GDP 79 63 124 62 48 36
Share of assets held by foreign banks 17d 12d 8 23 13 16e
Notes: a Includes assets acquired by the FRA from failed finance companies and assets transferred to
government (FIDF) AMCs.
b Includes 26 regional development banks.
c Assets held by state banks. Excludes assets already liquidated by the FRA (11 per cent of total
loans) because they have been sold back to the private sector.
d Includes joint banks.
e Includes BMB, which is about to be privatised.
Sources: World Bank (2000: 86); World Bank staff.
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capital and improved governance and management practices. Foreign ownership is low in
East Asian banking systems in comparison with those in other developing countries. And in
a number of countries – for example, Chile, Hungary and Poland – the increased entry of
foreign banks following a financial crisis has benefited financial development. Raising the
share of foreign ownership and management in the financial system therefore offers the most
direct means of improving credit evaluation practices and establishing a sound banking sector
(World Bank 2001).
The sale of state-owned banks to foreigners appears likely to be a slow process. Even
if foreign sales pick up, foreign ownership on its own is unlikely to alter fundamentally the
ownership structure of financial institutions: foreign institutions have traditionally been
interested in multinational and blue-chip firms and in trade financing, and may not be
inclined to inherit extensive branch networks. Opposition to foreign participation and
concerns over foreign dominance would likely increase if foreign ownership grows too rapidly.
Hence reprivatisation that attempts to break up cross-ownership structures will have to
involve more than just sales to foreigners.
Widening the ownership of banks may not provide effective governance until prudential
regulations are better enforced – hence selling off intervened bank shares fully to the public
may also not be the best option.15 Another option is to sell shares widely to the public but at
the same time encourage the new owners to oversee banks and provide effective governance
for a fee. The public’s best representatives would be firms with banking expertise. If some
banks are resold to the conglomerates, an effort should also be made (or legislation could be
passed) to limit the ownership stake by a single influential group, opting instead for resale
in smaller packages to a larger number of conglomerates. A combination of these schemes has
the potential to significantly dilute cross-ownership.16
Rising public sector debt
The resolution of the systemic crisis in the financial and corporate sectors has left a heavy
burden of debt with the government.17 Many governments have intervened to protect
depositors and some investors by injecting liquidity to support ailing financial institutions,
taking over non-performing loans, recapitalising weak but viable banks and nationalising and
then privatising non-viable banks. This intervention, financed through the government
budget, with bond issues or by increasing debt, has come at a substantial cost. Implicit
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guarantees to the financial system may increase the burden on governments if more banks
need to be recapitalised.18
Government debt has already risen to 30–50 per cent of GDP in Korea, Malaysia and
Thailand, and to 90–100 per cent of GDP in Indonesia and the Philippines (Table 7). These
figures may not reflect the governments’ underlying debt obligations because they do not
include contingent liabilities, such as further recapitalisation costs and the debts of public
infrastructure corporations and other state-owned enterprises. Large government debts and
debt-servicing obligations may pre-empt spending on development and social welfare.
Table 7 Public sector debt, 1996–2000a (per cent of GDP)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Recapitalisation
estimated to date cost ad-
ditional exp.
Indonesia 22.9 61.9 67.3 83.3 90.7 37.3 12.7
Domestic debt 0.0 0.0 16.3 44.4 52.8
Foreign debt 22.9 61.0 51.0 38.9 37.9
Interest/GDPb 1.8 2.4 3.1 3.7 6.0
Korea 8.8 14.2 24.7 33.2 36.2 15.8 10.7
Domestic debt 7.6 9.5 13.0 25.8 29.6
Foreign debt 1.2 4.6 11.7 7.4 6.6
Interest/GDP 0.4 0.5 1.1 2.0 2.7
Malaysia 35.4 31.9 36.30 37.4 n.a. 10.9 5.5
Domestic debt 31.2 27.3 31.0 31.2 n.a.
Foreign debt 4.1 4.6 5.2 6.1 n.a.
Interest/GDP 2.7 2.3 2.4 2.6 n.a.
Philippinesc 105.1 (62.8) 114.5 (53.1) 108.9 (53.1) 105.0 (56.6) n.a. (67.5) 0.0 n.a.
Domestic debt 72.5 (36.0) 70.7 (31.0) 62.7 (31.7) 59.6 (32.7) n.a. (29.8)
Foreign debt 32.6 (26.8) 43.9 (22.0) 46.2 (21.3) 45.4 (23.8) n.a. (37.7)
Interest/GDP 4.7 5.5 6.2 6.8 n.a.
Thailand 15.7 29.2 38.2 57.0 55.0 17.4 15.4
Domestic debt 7.0 15.9 27.7 29.0 25.0
Foreign debt 8.7 23.3 10.5 26.0 30.0
Interest/GDP 0.9 2.7 1.9 2.3 2.0
Notes: a The years indicated are fiscal years for Indonesia (1 April 1 – 30 March) and Thailand (1 October
– 30 September) and calendar years for Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines.
b The figure for 1999 does not include the 2.1 per cent GDP interest payment associated with the
bank recapitalisation bond.
c The numbers in parentheses refer to national government debt only.
Sources: World Bank (2000: 98); World Bank staff.
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The net costs that accrue to the public sector will depend on the success governments
have in recovering assets from debtors during restructuring and bankruptcy processes.
Future costs will also depend on the value of government holdings in recapitalised banks if
and when they are resold to the private sector. Governments need to maximise asset
recoveries in order to minimise the costs to the public of crisis resolution.
Box 3 Corporate governance in Western theory and East Asian practice
Corporate governance can be defined as addressing the ways in which principals (investors)
oversee their agents (managers of the firm). Corporate governance and corporate finance are hence
two sides of the same coin – how firms are governed is inextricably linked to how they are financed.
Much of the economic literature in the West (until recently) has focused on the problems
arising from the separation of ownership and control, or how the firms’ financiers prevent
expropriation or waste by the firms’ managers. This literature in turn stems from the image of a
typical firm that has widely dispersed ownership with control delegated to professional managers.
In practice, however, the proportion of firms that conform to this image is low and is concentrated
within a few advanced markets, especially in the US and UK.
The reality in most countries – certainly in East Asia outside of Japan – is for most firms to be
closely owned or privately held. The major shareholders of closely held firms typically also play an
active role in management and have the decisive vote in major decisions. Among publicly held
firms, highly concentrated share holdings and a predominance of controlling ownership are the
norm. Under these circumstances, the agency problem between ownership and control becomes
irrelevant. Moreover, concentrated ownership also brings potential advantages such as the ability
of a controlling owner to provide more focused strategic direction and to facilitate restructuring
and long-term commitment.
Where ownership is concentrated and the principal shareholders also manage the firm, the
major concern is that the firm’s operations could be structured to serve the insiders’ interest to the
detriment of overall profitability. For example, if business transactions are not at arm’s length,
profits can more easily be diverted to insiders through side deals in sales to and purchases from
related parties conducted for the profit of the insiders at the expense of the non-controlling
shareholders. The central issue of corporate governance under these conditions is therefore one of
how to prevent insiders from expropriating the assets of non-controlling shareholders.
Source: World Bank (2000: 84).
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Medium-term reform challenges
The crisis-affected countries in East Asia face three medium-term challenges in financial and
corporate sector reform: strengthening regulatory and supervisory frameworks for banking
systems, improving corporate governance and developing capital markets.
Improving regulatory and supervisory frameworks19
The need to address shortcomings in prudential regulations and supervision and to improve
accounting, auditing and legal standards in the banking sector has been widely emphasised
in the aftermath of the crisis. Each of the crisis-affected countries has adopted measures to
improve prudential control (Table 8), while tolerating some degree of forbearance in the
transition to recovery.20
Korea has perhaps gone the furthest in terms of strengthening bank supervision. The
newly created Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) has consolidated regulatory func-
Table 8 Changes in prudential standards in East Asia
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Thailand
Loan classification No change – Lowered from No change Lowered
(days elapsed before 180 days 180 days to –  180 days from  360
considered past due) 90 days days to
90 days
Loan-loss provisioning: From 0/50/100 From No change From
substandard/ to 10–15/50/100 20/75/100 – 0/50/100 0/50/100
doubtful/loss (backward to
looking) to
20/75/100 20/50/100
(forward looking)
Interest accrual Reduced from Reduced from No change, Reduced
up to 6 months up to 6 months up to 6 from up to 6
to up to 3 months; to up to 3  months; with months to up
no clawback months with clawback to 3 months;
clawback no clawback
Source: World Bank (2000: 82).
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tions that were previously shared between the finance ministry and central bank, enhancing
its regulatory credibility. However, weaker regulation of the chaebol-affiliated investment
trust companies allowed the ITCs to grow explosively since the crisis and to continue to
finance their loss-making chaebol affiliates. Adding to the problem, the banks were obliged
to support the ITCs following the Daewoo crisis, undermining the objective of improving credit
evaluation and risk management.
Most of the prudential measures will take time to implement, not least because of a lack of
human resources. Moreover, if implemented in isolation, their effectiveness may be limited.
Even in OECD countries, banking supervisors are seldom at the cutting edge of market
developments. And even though prudential, accounting and regulatory frameworks are more
sophisticated than what East Asia can realistically strive for in the medium term, banks can
fail before their problems are detected. Furthermore, as the discussion below suggests, the
effectiveness of prudential standards (as well as efforts to improve the protection of outside
investors) is closely intertwined with corporate ownership structures, which in turn reflect
the preferences of the dominant forces within government and the private sector – and may
be slower to change. The relationships between corporations, banks and governments have
been shaken by the crisis, and the manner in which these are rebuilt will have significant
implications for the effectiveness of prudential standards. While prudential standards are
essential ingredients of enhanced financial governance, governments need to recognise that
their effectiveness will not be determined in isolation.
Countries have continued to make progress on creating a policy and institutional
framework for prudential regulation and supervision. Two challenges remain: to strengthen
the implementation of the rules that have been put in place and to ensure that the supervision
is complemented with adequate incentives for both owners/managers and depositors to
reduce the risks of moral hazard that led to overlending before the crisis. In particular, the
design of deposit insurance schemes that protect the vulnerable but do not undermine
incentives will be an important challenge.
Improving corporate governance
The need to improve corporate governance is another important agenda item that East Asian
economies face. Disclosure, accounting and auditing standards are weak, the role of the board
of directors should be redefined and minority shareholders need more protection. Since
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corporations mirror the underlying corporate culture, improvements in corporate governance
require changes in business organisation.21 Technological developments and increased
exposure to competition will aid such fundamental changes. For instance, rapid developments
in information technology are expected to require the streamlining of business activities, and
greater competition in product, factor and capital markets is likely to impose greater
discipline on the way corporations are run.
Recent studies of corporate governance have documented large differences across
countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of
capital markets, and in the access of firms to external finance. One explanation for these
differences is the level of legal protection of outside investors, both shareholders and
creditors, from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms (La Porta
et al. 1999); although political factors may be more important to financial development than
legal systems.
The East Asian economies do not rank appreciably below other emerging markets in
terms of equity protection or creditor rights, although deficiencies in the enforcement of
investor rights reflecting judicial shortcomings were identified (La Porta et al. 1998).
Moreover, the valuations of firms controlled by inside shareholders were far below those of
comparable firms, suggesting the expropriation of outside investors may be significant
(Claessens et al. 1998).
Most assessments have pointed to the need to strengthen the rights of outside investors,
and there has been some progress on this front (Table 9), although the effectiveness of
enforcement remains an issue. In most countries effective enforcement of recent and
prospective changes will require sustained effort to improve the quality of the judiciary.
Enhancing transparency through more stringent (and enforced) disclosure requirements
using international accounting and auditing standards will be an essential complement to the
effort to strengthen investor protection. Credit-rating agencies, securities analysts, profes-
sional watchdogs and the financial media can play key roles in enhancing transparency. While
there may be powerful vested interests protecting the status quo, the pressure from foreign
investors for a convergence of regulatory standards should not be underestimated as capital
markets continue to integrate. The crisis has certainly increased consciousness about the
importance of corporate governance. Countries and corporations unable or unwilling to
address investor demands risk becoming increasingly ostracised, which itself can be an
important motivator for reform.
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If countries are successful in improving the protection of outside investors, the rationale
for interlocking ownership structures and financing arrangements will diminish, as the
benefits of greater choice in trade and finance begin to outweigh the comfort of traditional
relationships. Continued integration of trade and capital flows will loosen these relationships
further.
A growing body of recent work has characterised the East Asian conglomerate as one
in which a large number of firms, typically including one or more bank and non-bank financial
institution, are controlled by a single family. Family control can reach very high levels, even
for publicly traded firms. Control is often enhanced and further concentrated through
pyramid structures and a deviation from one-share-one-vote rules (Claessens et al. 1999), and
Table 9 Equity rights, creditor rights and judicial efficiency, mid-1999
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Thailand
Equity rights
One-share, one-vote 0 1 1 0
Proxy by mail 0 0 0 0
Shares not blocked 0 +1 0 +1
Cumulative voting 0 0 0 1
Equity rights score (sum) 0 2 1 2
Improvement over 1996 None +1 None +1
Creditor rights
Restrictions on reorganisations 1 1 1 1
No automatic stay on assets +1 0 0 1
Secured creditors first paid 0 1 1 0
Management does not stay on
in reorganisations +1 1 1 1
Creditor rights score (sum) 3 3 3 3
Improvement over 1996 +2 None None None
Judicial efficiency
Timetable to render judgement +1 +1 0 +1
Existence of a specialised
bankruptcy code +1 1 0 0
Judicial efficiency score (sum) 2 1 0 0
Improvement over 1996 +2 +1 None +1
Note: A 1 denotes that equity and creditor rights are in the law, that there are time limits to render
judgement and that specialised bankruptcy courts exist. A + indicates an improvement over the law
in place before the crisis; that is, in 1996.
Source: World Bank (2000: 84).
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members of company boards tend to have allegiance to the controlling family. Such
conglomerates account for large shares of overall market capitalisation and have preferential
access to credit because of their relationship with and ownership of financial institutions. The
top ten families in Indonesia and the Philippines were found to control more than half of the
listed corporate sector, and nearly half in Thailand, with the concentration of ownership lower
in more developed East Asian economies. Legal and regulatory systems have been influenced
by the concentration of corporate resources and the links large firms have to the government,
suggesting that prospective reforms in these areas will also be influenced by changes in
ownership structures.
At the same time, it is important to recognise that the structure of corporate ownership
in East Asia – both the dominance of conglomerates and the close relationships among firms
– has evolved in response to the business environment, the concentration of wealth, the
quality of the legal framework and the judiciary, the modus operandi of dealing with
government officials, and even ethnic factors. The crisis may have had a significant effect on
corporate ownership, but it is difficult to know how much of an effect.
Capital market development
The dominance of banks in financial intermediation has been another characteristic of East
Asian financial markets, and may have contributed to the build-up of systemic risk, given the
cross-ownership patterns. The combination of banks in distress and the lack of alternative
financing sources for most firms may have deepened the recessions that followed the crisis.
Since the crisis, capital markets have increasingly been called upon to play a larger role
in corporate finance, as banks struggle to regain their footing. The sustained development of
these markets can help to institutionalise arm’s length financial relationships (buttressed by
independent credit-rating agencies), lessen the role of relationship-based deals and provide
a ‘spare tyre’ in case of future banking crises (Greenspan 1999).
A number of factors could help strengthen the role of bond and equity markets in the
aftermath of the crisis, but these will depend on policy implementation. If efforts to dilute
conglomerate ownership of financial institutions are successful, the demand for alternative
sources of financing can be expected to increase among conglomerate-affiliated firms.
Improved protection of minority shareholders and enhanced transparency would strengthen
the supply of equity and bond finance. Since public deficits and debt have increased in the
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wake of fiscal stimulation and bank recapitalisation, government bond markets can be
expected to provide more reliable benchmarks for corporate bond issues – which, in fiscally
conservative East Asia before the crisis, were often missing.
To avoid distorting bond and equity markets, it will be important to ensure that tax
policies do not bias the financing choices of suppliers and firms. Ensuring that policy
interventions do not bias risk perceptions will be equally important. In the short run, the
blanket guarantee of bank deposits has tilted this balance in favour of banks. How
governments unwind the explicit and implicit guarantees on bank deposits to a more limited
but credible system of deposit guarantees will also influence the development of non-bank
capital markets. Finally, strengthening regulatory capacity in parallel to the development of
capital markets will be essential to avoid further costs from poor bank regulation.
Conclusion
The pervasive weakness in East Asian financial and corporate sectors was one of the most
important factors behind the crisis. Financial institutions were insufficiently regulated and
governed, and insufficiently capitalised with appropriate loan classifications and adequate
loan-loss provisions. A moral hazard was created because of the explicit or implicit govern-
ment guarantees to individual financial institutions.
The highly leveraged corporate sector in East Asia was extremely vulnerable when the
crisis hit. Abrupt currency depreciation sharply increased the domestic-currency value of
external debt, and high interest rates suddenly increased the debt-service obligations of
domestic corporations. The unexpectedly severe economic contraction damaged corporate
activity and profits, and reduced debtors’ ability to pay. The resulting increase in non-
performing loans deepened the crisis in the banking sector.
Resilient financial and corporate sectors are central in avoiding financial crises. To
establish such a system, commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions must have the
capabilities and expertise to efficiently manage assets, liabilities and risks; and the authori-
ties must have the capacity to maintain a solid framework of adequate supervision as well as
strong accounting and disclosure standards. On the corporate side, there must be prudent
financial management and transparent governance. Transparency in information through
credible accounting, auditing and disclosure practices, and a clear corporate governance
structure would allow banks and other creditors to make informed decisions about financing.
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Given the riskiness of institutions in emerging markets, it may be desirable to impose capital
adequacy requirements that are more demanding than those of the BIS, and to require tighter
loan classification and provisioning rules. A strong financial system is likely to enable banks
and non-bank financial institutions to weather adverse macroeconomic and asset-price
fluctuations. It has to be recognised, however, that strengthening financial systems and
putting in place good corporate governance require a change in business culture and will take
time.
It is important to encourage the development of local capital markets and equity
financing. An active market for corporate bonds and other debt can serve as both a warning
and an exit or redeployment mechanism, while equity financing is needed to cushion against
currency and interest rate shocks. It is also important to create and stimulate markets for
distressed assets, especially by inducing debt and real estate sales.
Upon the development of a systemic crisis in the financial and corporate sectors, a
government needs to ensure that a coherent framework for resolving banking and corporate
distress is put in place. This framework needs to stop bank runs, restore confidence in the
financial system and stabilise the finances of corporations. It should involve the following
procedures: (a) diagnostic reviews of bank portfolios based on internationally accepted
classification rules and accounting principles; (b) identification of viable and non-viable
banks; (c) resolution of non-viable banks (liquidation, closure, nationalisation, merger and
acquisition, etc.) to protect depositors, short-term creditors and viable borrowers; and (d)
recapitalisation of viable banks after full provisioning and revaluation of non-performing
loans at fair market prices and realistic recovery rates.
Governments will also need to segment the crisis and prioritise their responses. They
should first concentrate on the worst financial institutions, the most-distressed large
corporations, and small and medium-sized enterprises (Kawai et al. 2000). Restoring
confidence in the financial system requires the protection of bank deposits at problem
financial institutions and measures to allow closures, mergers or temporary nationalisation
of non-viable banks and the recapitalisation of weak but viable institutions. If public asset-
management corporations are needed to take over non-performing loans, they should be
insulated from political interference and designed to operate according to best commercial
and market practices.
Efficient resolution of a systemic corporate crisis depends on strengthening both court-
based and out-of-court resolution processes. East Asia’s experience has shown that effective
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domestic insolvency procedures are required for private creditors wishing to take action to
recover loans. The crisis-affected countries eliminated legal and tax impediments to corporate
restructuring, put in place or strengthened bankruptcy regimes and introduced market-
based frameworks for corporate restructuring based on the London Rules. This last approach
was particularly important as it provided creditors and debtors with incentives (carrots and
sticks) to implement voluntary workouts, through substantial changes in legal, tax and
regulatory environments and the development of deep capital markets. In a systemic crisis
involving a large number of distressed corporations, frequent recourse to court-supervised
processes would overwhelm the capacity of courts and insolvency professionals. Thus efficient
resolution of the crisis must also rely on these out-of-court processes.
The two approaches must, however, be undertaken in a concerted effort. Out-of-court
processes will not be effective unless enforceable court-based procedures are in place for
corporate bankruptcy, reorganisation and foreclosure. The reason corporate restructuring
has made some progress in Korea and Malaysia, but has been slow in Indonesia and Thailand,
is that the court-based procedures are credible alternatives to out-of-court procedures in the
former countries but not in the latter. Without the threat of court-imposed loss, there is not
enough incentive for corporate debtors to cooperate with voluntary efforts and agree to the
asset or business sales, equity dilution and diminution of management control that may be
part of a fair deal.
Ideally, corporate debtors should face a continuum of threat – beginning with the
possibility of prompt seizure of assets. Debtors should feel encouraged to seek protection
through court-supervised reorganisation as an alternative to liquidation or foreclosure.
Without strong creditor protection, an emphasis on restructuring through court-supervised
reorganisation will produce only limited results. In Thailand, for instance, efforts by
recalcitrant debtors to avoid court-supervised reorganisation indicated that the legal regime
for collecting debts was too weak. Court-supervised reorganisation needs to be a serious
option for restructuring distressed but viable corporations, and not just a forum for cracking
down on dissenting creditors in cases where the debtor happens to be cooperative.
As it can be extremely difficult to reform legal regimes to provide protection and
enforcement of creditor rights during a crisis – when the political risk to policymakers is high,
these reforms should be implemented in good times – that is, before a crisis occurs.
42
Pacific Economic Papers
Notes
* This paper will be published in Gordon de Brouwer (ed.), Financial Markets and
Policies in East Asia (Routledge, 2001).The author is thankful to participants of the
ANU conference that led to this paper for their comments, to David Bisbee for his
research assistance and to Sarah Leeming for her editorial assistance. The findings,
interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the author and
do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank, its executive directors or
the countries they represent.
1 See for example, World Bank (1998, 1999, 2000) and Lane et al. (1999).
2 An additional factor in Thailand’s case was the establishment of the offshore
Bangkok International Banking Facilities (BIBF). The BIBF induced large inflows of
foreign bank loans because local corporations and finance companies received
regulatory and tax advantages for borrowing through the BIBF rather than through
domestic banks. Foreign banks without domestic banking licenses also poured a large
amount of liquidity into Thailand in the hope of obtaining licenses. See Kawai and
Iwatsubo (1998).
3 The debt-to-equity ratio of Korean corporations, for example, was over 317 per cent
by the end of 1996, twice that of the United States and four times that of Taiwan. The
top thirty Korean chaebols had even higher leverage, exceeding 400 per cent in 1996.
See Claessens et al. (1998).
4 A high interest rate policy can defend the value of the currency at a small cost to the
economy when the domestic-currency debt of the corporate sector and consumers is
small, but the cost can be large when this debt is large.
5 In Indonesia the corporate sector’s large external debt was the most important factor
in the collapse of the corporate and banking sectors and the severe contraction of
aggregate demand. A steep currency depreciation tripled or quadrupled the size of
corporate debt and debt-servicing obligations. It is estimated that 70–80 per cent of
the firms in Indonesia suffered losses that exceeded their equity. Many corporations
experienced cash shortfalls, as their debt-to-equity ratio suddenly rose and as new
financing, either from domestic or external sources, was suddenly curtailed. As a
result of massive corporate insolvency, Indonesian banks could not collect interest on
their loans to corporate borrowers. In addition, some quality banks in Indonesia
suffered from the steep depreciation of the rupiah because of large foreign-currency
deposit liabilities to local residents.
6 Because of real exchange rate depreciation, there has not yet been a full recovery in
East Asia’s per capita GDP measured in US dollars, which is still lower than the pre-
crisis level in the affected countries.
7 Recapitalisation removes one disincentive for banks to renegotiate claims on highly
indebted firms. An inadequately capitalised bank risks being closed by its regulator
by admitting that its loans are worth less than their book value – which is the
implication of reducing the face value of its claim. An adequately capitalised bank
does not face this problem. See Lindgren et al. (1999) on the issues facing the East
Asian crisis-affected countries in restructuring their financial sectors.
43
No. 317 July 2001
8 The INDRA, however, had little success and was eventually abolished.
9 There are three types of implicit forbearance. First, financial institutions can be
allowed to provision for loan losses net of collateral value, mostly property, thus
allowing provisions to be understated. Second, quality control in the reclassification
of restructured loans does not have to be stringent, such as over the repayment
history. Third, the phasing in of net present valuation of restructured loans, instead
of the previous practice of relying on collateral value, can be postponed.
10 These frameworks include the Corporate Restructuring Agreement (CRA) in Korea,
the CDRC in Malaysia, the Corporate Debt Restructuring Advisory Committee
(CDRAC) in Thailand and the Jakarta Initiative Task Force (JITF) in Indonesia. The
initial expectation was that once financial obligations and property rights are
clarified and tax and regulatory changes are made, market-driven mechanisms
should promote debt restructuring and the reallocation of productive assets.
11 The passage of bankruptcy laws in Poland (1993) and Hungary (1989) generated a
flood of filings in each country, but this was because Poland gave creditor banks a
deadline and Hungary made the failure to file a criminal offence.
12 The pace of corporate restructuring in Thailand has been accelerated since the Bank
of Thailand introduced formal out-of-court restructuring contracts; that is, debtor–
creditor agreements. These contracts provide for: (1) a time-bound standstill (for
example, three months); (2) complete creditor access to all records for due diligence;
(3) joint management-creditors teams to monitor performance, develop cash flow
projections and control asset disposals; (4) priority for fresh working capital; (5)
interim milestones for completions of due diligence, the development of a restructur-
ing plan and creditor votes; (6) voting thresholds for creditor approval of a reorgani-
sation plan; (7) mediation or arbitration of differences among creditors; (8) conver-
sion of the case into court-supervised insolvency for failure to meet interim mile-
stones; and (9) penalties for non-compliance by financial institution signatories –
including failure to petition the court for debt collection, foreclosure or insolvency if
interim milestones are not met.
13 The IBRA has the power under decree No. 17 of 1999 to seize the assets of failed
companies.
14 An indebted firm struggling to survive and continue operations would prefer to use
cash flows to pay workers and suppliers rather than creditors. This does not hurt
creditors if the value of the firm as a going concern is greater than the liquidation
value, because they retain the option to liquidate the firm later if they choose. Nor
would creditors seek to oust the firm’s managers if they have no ready and better
replacement (as is generally the case when the problem is systemic). So although
their claims are not being serviced, it may be rational for creditors to rollover even
non-performing loans if they expect that the firm’s performance will improve. Giving
creditors the right to liquidate the firm or oust the managers (as under a bankruptcy
law) would not necessarily induce them to do so – even if the laws and courts were
perfect. So, while better bankruptcy laws may be necessary in the long run, they are
no panacea for resolving all crises and their disuse should not come as a surprise.
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15 The scope for widespread public ownership in East Asia is also more limited than in
OECD countries because the middle class makes up a smaller percentage of the
population.
16 As governments dispose of banks back to the private sector or to the foreign sector,
legislation should be considered to limit the proportion of financial institutions that
can be owned by conglomerates and to disallow controlling ownership. The sequencing
of these measures and their political feasibility will vary across countries. Tackling
the complexities of ownership reform when governments are preoccupied by financial
and corporate restructuring may seem ill advised. Yet some of the issues are integral
to the restructuring process and cannot be put off. The manner in which reprivati-
sation of banks is conducted will affect ownership patterns, and if cross-ownership
is not reduced, the restructuring of corporations will be slower. If, for example, an
undercapitalised bank is a major creditor to an overindebted firm from the same
conglomerate, restructuring negotiations involving third parties will be compro-
mised.
17 The crisis increased budget deficits through other channels also. First, the currency
devaluations precipitated balance sheet losses on government books, and the interest
burden (in local currency) on foreign debt rose by roughly 30 per cent (the amount of
nominal devaluation). Second, as the recession deepened, tax revenues declined and
spending rose. Third, as the depth of the recession became apparent, most govern-
ments further increased spending to stimulate the economy. As a result, the fiscal
balance of the crisis-affected countries deteriorated sharply into deficit.
18 Government-guaranteed contracts in the power and roads sectors include further
potential liabilities for the public sector. It is difficult to estimate the magnitude of
these liabilities, but the governments of Thailand and Indonesia are expected to face
large obligations once public infrastructure corporations have completed their
negotiations over the distribution of losses.
19 This subsection and the following two draw heavily on the last section of Chapter 4
of World Bank (2000).
20 Reaching BIS capital adequacy standards and loan classification and provisioning
standards instantaneously is hardly a credible option if the banking system cannot
comply.
21 The prevalence of business transactions based on relationships between firms or on
trust has been a feature of all the East Asian economies. While lowering the
transaction and agency costs that come about from asymmetric information, trust is
not enough to sustain complex operations in an increasingly global market, and arm’s
length relationships need to be developed.
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